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Abstract 
This paper presents a model analyzing the potential for an International Court with powers to 
declare standstills to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to roll-overs in sovereign 
debt markets. It is shown that, regardless of the quality of the information handled by such 
an Institution, the scale of the coordination problem is reduced since its mere existence 
forces investors to focus on the Court's course of action rather than on other investors' 
beliefs. Furthermore, the model shows that, in order to avoid moral hazard, the right of 
recourse to the Court should be made conditional. 
Keywords: Sovereign Debt, liquidity runs, standstills, effort. 
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Introduction
The succession of financial crises in emerging markets since the mid 90’s raised awareness
about the specific risks posed by financial globalization for a number of countries. This real-
ization prompted an intense debate on the reform of the international financial architecture,
and various far-reaching proposals have been discussed over the last decade in both academic
and official circles. More often than not, this debate has revolved around the extent to which
emerging markets crises have been primarily a result of failures in international financial markets
or of mistaken policies. Those stressing the importance of market failures have advocated for
the creation of a meaningful official financial safety net articulated around the IMF acting as
a pseudo-lender of last resort (Fisher, 1999). In turn, those stressing the importance of policy
failures have prioritized the need to avoid distorting the incentives of both sovereign borrowers
and private lenders, placing moral hazard at the centre of the discussion. Eventually, the debate
has tended to result in the adoption of difficult compromises between the two camps, of which
the Prague Framework for crisis resolution is a good example. According to this framework,
adopted by the international community in 2001, liquidity crises ought to be resolved by com-
bining limited and predictable official assistance, catalysis of private capital flows, and private
sector involvement.
In the realm of solvency crises, two differing approaches can also be identified. On the one
hand, according to the statutory approach, an international institution is needed to intervene
in situations in which a standstill and/or a debt restructuring is needed to restore a country’s
solvency. Such an institution could take the form of an international solvency regime (Sachs,
1995 or Rogoff, 2003) or of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime (SDRM) proposed by
Krueger in 2002 and shelved in 2003. On the other hand, the contractual or market-based
approach, which was ultimately adopted by the international community, argues in favour of
including collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts (see Krueger, 2002 or Eichengreen
et al., 2003). Such CACs allow for a pre-specified majority of bond holders to approve the
terms of a debt restructuring, preventing such processes from being held hostage to the action
of rogue creditors, and potentially mitigating the collective action problems inherent to debt
restructurings. The inclusion of CACs in sovereign bonds is generally considered as a successful
2
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experience, given that this practice has become widely accepted by the market relatively fast. 1
Their potential in a crisis resolution setting, however, remains to be seen. Indeed, there is still
a relatively large proportion of outstanding bonded debt that does not include CACs, and other
contractual innovations, such as aggregation clauses, may be needed to prevent minority groups
from disrupting restructuring processes.2
This paper provides a fresh look at the statutory approach to crisis resolution from a theo-
retical perspective. The framework outlined here, however, differs from previous proposals such
as the SDRM in the sense that it is designed to cope with liquidity problems. . It is argued that
there could be scope for creating an international entity, i.e. an International Investment Court
(IIC) which would monitor countries, would be empowered to declare standstills under certain
circumstances and, if necessary, would decide on how debt should be restructured.3 The paper
shows that designing debt contracts which, in case of a liquidity crisis, allow for arbitration
and for the application of a standstill/restructuring, reduces the coordination problem faced
by creditors, and enhances aggregate well being. It is also analyzed whether such a measure,
as argued in the literature, may generate debtors’ moral hazard. Although moral hazard can
not be ruled out, conditions under which the presence the IIC represents an incentive to apply
corrective policies are found.
Global games and standstills have rarely been analyzed together. The global games tech-
nique has been extensively used to analyze other policy measures against sovereign liquidity and
solvency problems, such as collective action clauses or official lending.4 Haldane et al. (2002) is
an exception. They present a model which includes both a rollover global game and a restruc-
turing game. However, they model standstills as an exit tax charged on creditors whenever they
decide not to roll-over, but they do not include an international authority in the model. They
discuss some possible drawbacks of a standstills policy, such as moral hazard or the effect on the
composition and amount of capital inflows, but without conducting any formal analysis. Miller
and Zhang (2000), using a different framework, argue that, without an orderly procedure, the
IMF is de facto forced to bail out distressed members, leading to the risk of investors’ moral
hazard. In their opinion, the strategic reason for legalizing standstills on payments is to rescue
the authorities from this ‘time inconsistency’ trap. Gai et al (2004) find that the effectiveness
3
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of standstills depend on the quality of official sector surveillance. Present results confirm this
point. Moreover, the model identifies certain conditions in the economy and in the behavior
of both investors and the Court which increase the standstill policy’s potential to mitigate the
coordination problem. In the model presented here standstills are used as a tool to avoid liq-
uidity problems. This view is supported by the work of Haldane and Saporta (2003), who find
that standstills are a useful tool for solving liquidity crises. Ghosal and Miller (2003) analyze
the moral hazard implications of a SDRM (see Krueger, 2002 or Sachs,1995) which includes
a public agency which implements the mechanism. They find that for the mechanism to give
incentives to the debtor to exert effort it need to have been agreed ex-ante. Due to its statutory
nature, the model presented here, fulfils this characteristic. Gai and Shin (2004) find that if
an international solvency regime increases the recovery rate on default, this policy should not
necessarily imply a rush for the exits. In Martin and Peñalver (2003) standstills tilt the term
structure for sovereign bonds, due to a combination of reduced liquidity and reduced risk of
default. The present analysis, from a partial equilibrium perspective, does not deal with these
issues.
Eaton (2003) finds that the main risk of having an International Court comes from its
possible moral hazard implications. He argues that if the Court were to impose sanctions only
when justified it could increase the incentives of sovereign debtors to repay their debt.5 He also
concludes that for standstills to improve efficiency the Court has to be better informed than the
creditors.
As Haldane et al. (2002), the model in this paper places the coordination problem, and
more specifically the role of asymmetric information, at the core of the problem. This paper
moves a step ahead by modelling the Court as an additional player. This is important because
it permits to model the strategic interaction between both the Court and the players, who are
forced to guess not only other investors´ moves but also the course of action by the Court.
An important implication, is that as investors need to focus on the behavior of the Court, the
extent to which other investors´ beliefs matter is reduced, mitigating the coordination problem.
Another important result regards the role that the accuracy of the information handled by the
IIC has. This paper elaborates on the point made by Eaton (2003), and shows the conditions
4
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under which a better informed court may not only improve the outcome, but may also reduce
the coordination problem. It is also shown that better information does not always guarantee a
smaller coordination problem. In line with the results presented in Ghosal and Miller (2003) it is
found that ex-ante agreement on the circumstances in which standstills can be applied mitigates
their potential moral hazard implications. In this paper the ex-ante agreement is related to the
presence of conditionality.
From a technical point of view, the paper draws on Corsetti et al. (2005), which uses the
same technique to analyze the role of the IMF as a lender of last resort. However, in the
present analysis the "big player" only cares about liquidity problems, and therefore only acts in
a determined interval. This departs from the solution presented in Corsetti et al. (2005). It is
shown that, in a global game with heterogeneous agents, there is a unique equilibrium in which
"small players" use trigger strategies even if the "big player" does not.
Section I outlines a simple model of debt crises where private and public information interact.
In Section II the international arbitrator is introduced into the game, and some basic features
of both models are compared. Section III evaluates the moral hazard implications of such a
policy when it is implemented with or without conditionality. Section IV concludes. The more
technical proofs can be found in the Appendix.
I. A benchmark model
To set the stage for the analysis, it is useful to use a model with standard features as a benchmark.
The model is a modification of the global games literature pioneered by Carlsson and Van Damme
(1993), and draws straight from Chui et al. (2002). It analyzes a small open economy during
three time periods defined below.
There is a continuum of investors, with mass equal to one, willing to lend up to d in a short
term horizon at an interest rate i. The outside option for the investors is a safe asset whose
return is equal to the world sure rate of return iw which, for simplicity, is set equal to zero.
There is a government with own resources amounting to O. It has access to an international
liquid asset denoted byM , and a domestic risky investment, I. The risky investment yields θ in
period 2, or θ / (1+k) in period 1.We further assume that θ is normally distributed with mean
5
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bθ > iw, and variance 1 / γ.6 The parameter k ∈ (0,∞), reflects the existence of liquidation cost
associated with the partial or complete liquidation of the investment prior to its completion in
period 2. The government seeks to borrow in order to to carry on the investment opportunity.
However, it can only borrow money on a short term basis and hence, in period 1, needs to be
able to roll over this debt.
In period 0, the government invests both O and d, in the domestic investment I and in the
international safe asset M , O + d =M + I. These parameters are taken as given.
In period 1, investors receive a private noisy signal about the state of the fundamentals, and
based on it they take the decision of rolling over their loans or withdrawing.
In period 2, the government repays outstanding debt and consumes what is left.
Liquidity and solvency
Think first of a scenario where all investors decide to roll over. Define D as the amount due to
repayment to foreign investors, i.e. (1 + i)d = D. In this case the country is solvent in period
2 whenever θI +M ≥ D. This defines the minimum rate at which the country would still be
solvent in the absence of a run. Call it fundamental insolvency rate, θs = D−MI .
In the unique equilibrium, a positive mass of investors withdraws their money. Denote the
proportion of investors not rolling over with f . In period 1, the country needs an amount of
liquidity equal to fD. If M < fD, the country will liquidate part of the domestic investment.
The proportion of the domestic investment to be liquidated can be calculated as l = (1 +
k) (fD−M)+θI . After liquidating part of its investment in order to repay early withdrawals, in
period 2, the country counts with resources θ(1− l)I to repay outstanding debt (1−f)D. Then,
for an observed level f of investors fleeing, the minimum rate, θ0(f), at which the country would
still be solvent in period 2 is,
(1) θ0(f) = θs + k
(fD −M)+
I
> θs.
6
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0636 
Payoffs and information
Following Rochet and Vives (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2005), the payoff structure of the private
investors is modelled as dependent on making the right choice. If the final outcome is a default,
the right choice for the creditors would be to flee, which gives investors w more units of utility
than rolling over. Instead, if the final outcome is not a default, the right choice would be to roll
over, and doing so provides a utility r units larger than that obtained by withdrawing.7 This
assumption makes the perceived utility independent of the extent of default, implying that the
analysis abstracts from distributional issues between the creditors and the country.
It is assumed that the economic fundamentals, θ, are unknown, although their distribution
is common knowledge. Together with the payoffs, this is the public information in the model.
In addition, investors receive private signals. The distribution of these signals is common knowl-
edge, but the realization is privately observed. Creditors get a signal si = θ + εi, where εi
is normally distributed with zero mean and precision α. They will rely on their signals to up-
date their beliefs. Their updated beliefs are normally distributed, θ|si ∼ N(siα+eθγα+γ , 1α+γ ). The
mean of this distribution will be denoted by ρi = E[θ|si]. Φ and φ stand for the standardized
cumulative distribution and the associated density function respectively.
Equilibrium: runs and solvency
Uniqueness, as shown in the Appendix, is guaranteed when the relative (with respect to the
public) precision of the private signal is large enough. The unique equilibrium is defined by
a unique rate of return θ0, which produces a distribution of public and private signals such
that there is a unique investor with signal s0 which makes him indifferent between fleeing or
staying. Private investors withdraw their money in period 1 if their updated beliefs about the
fundamentals fall below some critical value ρ0, which corresponds to the unique value s0 of the
private signal.In order to solve for the two unknowns, two equations have to be set.
The first comes from identifying the lower level of returns necessary to make a run successful,
the "mass condition". That threshold is defined in equation (1). Given that the proportion of
investors withdrawing corresponds with the proportion of investors receiving a signal below s0,8
7
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f = P [si < s0|θ] = Φ(
√
α(s0 − θ)), the condition can be rewritten as,
(2) s0 = θ0 +
1√
α
Φ−1((θ0 − θs +
kM
I
)
I
kD
).
The second equation can be obtained from the fact that, in equilibrium, the marginal investor is
indifferent between staying or fleeing. The probability of a successful run is given by P [θ < θ0/ρi],
that can be expressed as P [θ < θ0/ρi] = Φ(
√
α+ γ(θ0− αsi+γeθα+γ )). Using this, the condition reads:
r[1− Φ(
√
α+ γ(θ0 − αs
0
α+ γ
− γ
bθ
α+ γ
))]− wΦ(
√
α+ γ(θ0 − αs
0
α+ γ
− γ
bθ
α+ γ
)) = 0.
For values above θ0, the optimal action is to stay, which gives r units of utility more than
fleeing, while for values below θ0 a run is successful and therefore staying gives w units of utility
less than fleeing. Manipulation of this expression delivers,
(3) θ0 =
αs0
α+ γ
+
1√
α+ γ
Φ−1(
r
r + w
) +
γbθ
α+ γ
.
Equation (3), together with equation (2) allow to solve for the equilibrium values θ0 and s0.
These completely characterize the economy. The probability of observing a default is P (θ < θ0),
and the size of the run is P (s < s0).
II. What can be gained by introducing standstills?
Now an International Investments Court is introduced in the economy described above. The
Court will be in charge of calling standstills/ rescheduling the debt, when necessary. The first
goal is to analyze how the coordination problem is affected by the presence of this entity. Later
its moral hazard implications are analyzed.
An International Investments Court
Standstills, as well as the creation of an International Investments Court (IIC), are at the heart
of many recent proposals aimed at mitigating the problems posed by sovereign defaults, and
their adverse effects for the smooth functioning of financial markets. By analyzing the effect
8
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that creating an International Court in charge of rescheduling sovereign debt could have on
the coordination problem faced by investors, both proposals are embedded. The role of such
an institution would be to monitor issuing countries, and when these undergo financial stress,
assess the situation, and decide whether allowing the country to temporarily suspend payments
(go on a standstill) is the right measure. In line with the proposal by Ghosal and Miller (2003),
the decisions of the Court are modelled in terms of a procedure to cope with liquidity problems.
This view differs from the one held by the IMF (Krueger, 2002). In their SDRM proposal
they envision this institution as a tool to cope with insolvency problems. The present proposal
implies a contractual obligation, as it requires that both, creditors and sovereigns, submit to a
supranational authority to determine when a standstill may be necessary.9
A model of sovereign debt crises in the presence of an IIC
Now there is a third actor, the IIC, which has its own rule of action based on its private
information. This takes the form of a private signal received in the interim period. Both the
Court and investors move simultaneously in period 1. The analysis, from a partial equilibrium
perspective, leaves D and I unchanged.
Liquidity and solvency in the presence of IIC.
Recall that, if a proportion f of investors flee, the minimum rate θ∗(f) at which the country
is still solvent in period 2 is θ∗(f) = θs + k
(fD−M)
I . Whenever the value of the fundamentals
falls in the interval [−∞, θ∗(f)] the country will default if the IIC does not declare a standstill.
However, even if the IIC declares a standstill, the country defaults if θ < θs. This implies that
the only scenario in which the declaration of a standstill by the IIC will change the final outcome
and avoid default by the country, is whenever θ ∈ [θs, θ∗(f)].
IIC: Payoffs and information
The IIC’s goal, when using standstills, is to avoid liquidity problems that may evolve into default.
Depending on its signal, it has to decide on whether the right action is calling a standstill or
letting investors flee. It is assumed that the Court is not interested in protecting countries which
9
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are doomed to fail (those with θ < θs), nor countries which are solvent even in the presence of a
run (θ > θ∗(f)).10 As with investors, the Court’s payoff depends on making the right decision.
We assume that declaring a standstill has a fixed cost for the Court of C > 0. Apart from this
fixed cost, if the standstill was properly called, the IIC perceives a utility R. But if the standstill
was incorrectly called, the Court will face a disutility equal to qR. The Court will be willing
to declare a standstill as long as the expected payoff from doing so is non-negative. As before,
investors perceive utility r when, after rolling-over, the country does not default. Again, if an
investor decided to flee and the country defaults, this utility will be w. Note that if the Court
correctly called a standstill, those who rolled over receive a higher payoff.11
It is assumed that the Court only knows its own private signal, the distribution of the
fundamentals, and that of the signals held by investors.
The IIC receives a signal S = θ+v, where v ∼ N(0, 1β ). It uses it to update its beliefs, which
become θ|S ∼ N( (βS+γeθ)β+γ , 1β+γ ). Define ρIIC = E[θ|S], and denote the cumulative distribution
and the density function of the Court, with Π and π respectively.
Solvency, runs and standstills in equilibrium
This section characterizes the new equilibrium of the economy. As mentioned above, the IIC’s
main interest is to protect countries for which the declaration of a standstill may change the
final outcome, those with θ ∈ (θs,θ∗(f)). As in the simple framework analyzed before, the core
of the model is the coordination problem among investors who are uncertain about each other’s
information. In addition, now they are also concerned with the information handled by the IIC.
The payoff of rolling over depends positively on both the amount of investors rolling over and
on the willingness of the Court to call a standstill. This set-up has a similar structure to that of
Corsetti et al. (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2005). However, conversely to the contributions above,
here the "big player" (the IIC) acts only for a determined range of signals. In the Appendix it
is shown that, even in this case, the model presents an equilibrium in which investors employ
trigger strategies. It is also shown that, by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, the
derived equilibrium in trigger strategies is the unique equilibrium of the game.,
Four variables characterize the equilibrium. A threshold for the fundamental, θ∗, below
10
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which the country defaults if there is no restructuring, a threshold s∗ for the private signal of
the investors, and two thresholds for the private signal of the Court, S, which represent the
maximum and minimum signals for which the Court will act. These are represented by Ssup
and Sinf respectively.
Let’s start by θ∗. As before, if the threshold for the investors is s∗, the proportion of investors
withdrawing corresponds to the proportion of investors with a signal below s∗, f = Prob(ρi ≤
ρ∗\θ) = prob(si ≤ s∗\θ) = Φ(√α(s∗ − θ)). Plugging this into equation (2), the upper threshold
of the fundamentals implying insolvency becomes,
(4) θ∗ = θs[1 + k
[Φ(
√
α(s∗ − θ∗)) ·D −M ]+
D −M ].
When the Court does not intervene, there will be a default if θ ≤ θ∗(s∗).
Next the equation that determines s∗, Ssup and Sinf are introduced. The Court assigns
the following probability to its intervention being successful
R θ∗
θs
π((
√
β + γ(θ− ρIIC))dθ, where
ρIIC =
(βS+γeθ)
β+γ . The IIC ’s expected payoff becomes,
(5) R
Z θ∗
θs
π((
p
β + γ(θ − ρIIC))dθ − qR(1−
Z θ∗
θs
π((
p
β + γ(θ − ρIIC))dθ ≥ C.
The optimal strategy for the Court is to declare a standstill whenever this inequality holds. In
the margin, when the Court is indifferent between calling a standstill or not, the expression
above holds with equality. As shown in Figure 1, this rule of action, as already mentioned, leads
the Court to act only if its signal falls within a determined interval. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let C∗ = (1− q)R.
(1) If C < C∗, the IIC’s optimal strategy is to declare a standstill when its private signal
falls within a range [SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC ], where S
inf
IIC and S
sup
IIC are the unique values of S for which (5)
holds with equality, with SinfIIC < S
sup
IIC .
(2) If C > C∗, the Court never declares a standstill.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
11
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Figure 1. IIC standstills declaration
The intuition for this result is the following. As the signal of the IIC diminishes, the proba-
bility that a standstill avoids a default decreases, and this reduces the expected value of calling a
standstill. Similarly, when the value of the signal increases, the probability of calling a standstill
unnecessarily increases, which again reduces the expected value of calling the standstill. The
IIC is interested in calling standstills when its updated beliefs do not fall far from the threshold
for fundamental insolvency or for solvency even in the presence of a run.
Finally, one can solve for the threshold of investors. In order to maximize their utility, they
take into account that if the true state of the economy is below θs, the economy will default
in period 2 no matter what the IIC does. However, for values of the fundamentals lying in
the interval [θs, θ∗(s∗)], the country will default only if the IIC does not declare a standstill.
Therefore, they assign probability Φ(
p
(α+ γ)(θs − ρi)) to the country defaulting no matter
what the IIC does. As before, the threshold for the private signal of the investors is determined
by the signal for which the creditor receiving it is indifferent between staying or running. Using
12
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inf
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the different utility outcomes defined above, the payoff from not rolling over can be defined as,
UNR = w[
Z θs
−∞
√
α+ γφ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))dθ
+
Z SinfIIC
−∞
Z θ∗
θs
√
α+ γ
p
βπ(
p
β(SIIC−θ))φ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))dSIICdθ
+
Z ∞
ssupIIC
Z θ∗
θs
√
α+ γ
p
βπ(
p
β(SIIC−θ))φ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))dSIICdθ],
where φ and π are the density functions of Φ and Π respectively, and ρ∗ = αs
∗+γeθ
α+γ .
The first element within the square brackets corresponds with the probability assigned by
creditors to the country defaulting despite the IIC action. As long as the true rate of return
falls below θs, the country always defaults, justifying an investor’s decision to seek to run. The
second and third elements correspond to the situations where creditors observe a signal on the
interval in which the IIC’s action could avoid default. In this scenario not rolling over is optimal
conditional upon the IIC not acting. As the IIC will not act when its own beliefs fall outside
the [SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC ] interval, it delivers the two terms, the first referring to the case with a signal
below SinfIIC , and the second corresponding to signals above S
sup
IIC . Similarly we can define the
corresponding payoff from rolling over as,
UR = r[
Z ∞
θ∗
√
α+ γφ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))dθ
+
Z SsupIIC
SinfIIC
Z θ∗
θs
√
α+ γ
p
βπ(
p
β(SIIC−θ))φ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))dSIICdθ].
The first term expresses the probability of a run not succeeding whatever the Court does,
while the second corresponds to the probability of being in the critical interval [θs, θ∗(s∗)] con-
ditional upon the IIC restructuring, and hence corresponds to the probability of the run being
unsuccessful, conditional upon the Court calling a standstill.
It is important to note that the expressions above account for the fact that, for every thresh-
old value for the updated beliefs set by the creditors, there is a different maximum rate for
default, θ∗. This is so because every s∗ determines a unique level of early withdrawals, which, in
turn, implies a different maximum rate. Thereby, every threshold, by implying a different level
of pressure on the domestic economy, leads to a different range of fundamentals under which the
13
BANCO DE ESPAÑA       20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0636 
IIC will be willing to act, i.e. [θs, θ∗(s∗)].
With this, we can rewrite the "zero-profit "condition, UR − UNR = 0, as,
(6)
r
r + w
= Φ(
√
α+ γ(θ∗−ρ∗))−
Z θ∗
θs
√
α+ γφ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))Π(SsupIIC , S
inf
IIC)dθ,
where Π(SsupIIC , S
inf
IIC) =Π(
√
β(SsupIIC − θ))−Π(
√
β(SinfIIC − θ)). All ρ∗,θ∗, S
sup
IIC , and S
inf
IIC depend
on s∗.
This equation determines the equilibrium threshold of the beliefs, s∗, below which private
investors withdraw their money. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find a close form solution
for the threshold for the beliefs. However, as shown in the Appendix , in the case of highly
informative private signals, there is a unique trigger solution for this equation. This last equation,
together with the one for θ∗(s∗), the one for θs, and the one determining [SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC ] completely
characterize the equilibrium of the model. The Appendix shows that, under standard
conditions, there is a unique equilibrium in trigger strategies.12
Aggressiveness and Probability of crises: comparing outcomes
How does the introduction of standstills affect creditors’?, Does the presence of the Court reduce
the probability of observing a crisis?.
Proposition 2 Allowing the IIC to declare standstills on the payments reduces agents’ incen-
tives to withdraw their money in the interim period, s∗ < s0.
The intuition is that the existence of such an institution mitigates the coordination problem
faced by creditors by allowing them to be less concerned about what other investors think.
Proof. Without the Court, Φ(
√
α+ γ(θ0(s0)− ρ0)) = rr+w , where ρ0 =
αs0+γeθ
α+γ .
While with the Court,
r
r + w
= Φ(
√
α+ γ(θ∗(s∗)− ρ∗))−
√
α+ γ
Z θ∗
θs
φ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))F (s∗)dθ,
where ρ∗ = αs
∗+γeθ
α+γ , F (s
∗) = Π(SsupIIC , S
inf
IIC), F (s
∗) ∈ (0, 1) . Define p = √α+ γ.
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Noting that Φ(p(θ∗(s∗)− ρ∗))−
R θ∗
θs
φ(p(θ − ρ∗))F (s∗)dθ = Φ(p(θ0(s0)− ρ0)), then
Φ(p(θ∗(s∗)− ρ∗)) > Φ(p(θ0(s0)− ρ0))⇔ s∗ − θ∗(s∗) < s0 − θ0(s0).
Now, using the "mass condition" one can see that both θ0(s0) and θ∗(s∗) are strictly increasing
in s− θ(s), so that θ∗(s∗) < θ0(s0). Use the positive relation between θ(s) and s to get s∗ < s0.
This proves the initial statement. In the absence of a standstill policy, investors are more
aggressive, meaning that they are ready to run with higher signals. This also implies that, absent
a standstill policy, the true return which generates such signals is larger, thereby increasing the
economy’s vulnerability. This can be seen by analyzing the probability of observing a crisis,
calculated as the probability of having a rate of return below the threshold, Prob(θ < θ0 (s0)) >
Prob(θ < θ∗(s∗)). As a result, the ex-ante probability of observing a crisis is larger in the absence
of the IIC.
The presence of an International Court with authority to call standstills can provide not only
ex post benefits (as it can implement barriers to capital outflows when these appear), but is
also beneficial ex ante, as it reduces the coordination problem by making agents less concerned
about other agents information, making runs and crises less likely.
The role of the accuracy of the Court’s information
The analysis above implies that the mere presence of the Court, even if its information is not
very accurate, may be enough to reduce the coordination problem. When will the quality of the
information handled by the Court increase its potential to mitigate the coordination problem?.
The propositions below show that when the court is cautious enough, and fundamentals are such
that the Court should act, the better informed the IIC, the smaller the coordination problem.
First, a definition that will be used in proving the statement above is presented.
Definition 1 The Court is said to act cautiously whenever its range of action (SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC) is
contained in the interval (θs, θ∗).
This means that it does not act if its own signal falls out of the range of fundamentals for
which it should do so.
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The next propositions show how a higher variable cost makes the Court more cautious and
the implications this has for the precision of the Court’s information.
Proposition 3 When q is sufficiently large, the Court acts cautiously.
Proof. Recall the equation determining the interval of action for the Court:
Λ(eS) = Z θ∗
θs
π(
p
β + γ(θ − γ
bθ + β eS
γ + β
))dθ =
qR+ C
R(1 + q)
= F (q).
Note that lim
SsupIIC→∞
Λ(SsupIIC)= lim
SinfIIC→−∞
Λ(SinfIIC) = 0. Also note that
∂F (q)
∂q > 0. It is clear that
as q increases, SinfIIC has to increase and S
sup
IIC has to decrease. Given that the three equations
are continuous, there exists a q such that (SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC) ⊂ (θs, θ∗).
Proposition 4 If the Court acts cautiously and if θ ∈ (SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC), then the bigger the precision
of signal extracted by the Court, β, the smaller θ∗.
Proof. As already noted the reduction in the coordination problem can be measured by the
size of the term
R θ∗
θs
√
α+ γφ(
√
α+ γ(θ − ρ∗))Π(SsupIIC , SinfIIC)dθ. The bigger it is, the smaller the
coordination problem. Note that only Π(SsupIIC , S
inf
IIC) is changing with β.
∂Π(SsupIIC , S
inf
IIC)
∂β
= [π(
p
β(SsupIIC−θ))(
∂
√
β
∂β
(SsupIIC−θ)+
p
β
∂SsupIIC
∂β
)
−π(
p
β(SinfIIC−θ))(
∂
√
β
∂β
(SinfIIC−θ) +
p
β
∂SinfIIC
∂β
)]
What matters is the sign of the expression above. It has been shown that, if the Court is cautious
then ∂S
sup
IIC
∂β > 0 and
∂SinfIIC
∂β < 0. If in addition, θ ∈ (SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC) all the elements have the correct
sign as to guarantee that ∂Ψ(β)∂β is undoubtedly bigger than zero.
The condition θ ∈ (SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC), as long as the Court is cautious, implies that θ ∈ (θs, θ∗).
Whenever the fundamental position of an economy is such that a cautious Court should call a
standstill, then the better informed the Court, the smaller the coordination problem becomes.
Figure 2 in the Appendix graphically represents the action interval of a cautious IIC.
Summary 1 The presence of better informed IIC in illiquid economies:
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1) Reduces the region in which a coordination problem exists, ∂(θ
∗−θs)
∂β < 0.
2) As a result the probability of a debt crisis, P (θ < θ∗) is also reduced.
III. A first look at moral hazard
Finally, the model assesses the implications of the proposed policy on debtors economies’ incen-
tives to implement costly adjustment policies. This is relevant given the importance of moral
hazard considerations in the debate on the reform of the international financial architecture.
It will be shown that moral hazard will depend critically on the conditions under which
sovereigns are allowed to resort to the Court. For simplicity the analysis is performed in the
limit case, in which the precision of the private signals goes to infinity (α, β →∞). This implies
that in equilibrium, there will be no heterogeneity, and therefore partial withdrawals won’t be
observed.13
It is assumed that the government can implement some policies which increase the expected
return from θL to θH , with a cost that is assumed to be fixed.
Analyze first the benchmark case, when no International Court exists. The country’s welfare
depends on the amount of effort as follows: if no effort is applied, then
lim
α→∞
WN (L) =
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θL) · dθ.
If effort is applied,
lim
α→∞
WN (H) =
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ −Cost.
g stands for the density function for the distribution of the returns conditional on the level of
effort, and G for the corresponding cumulative distribution.
The country’s net change in welfare when implementing these policies is,
4WN= I · 4θ(1−G(θ0/θL))+
R θ0+4θ
θ0 [θI +M −D]g(θ/θH) · dθ − Cost.
The lower limit of integration corresponds with θ0, as only for returns above that threshold
will the country have some cash left. The benefits of implementing the effort come from both,
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the increase in the expected return of the project, and the effect that this has on creditors’
behavior, as it will be more likely that their signals will go above the critical threshold, which
reduces liquidation costs.
When the IIC is present, the country’s welfare can be calculated as,
4W IIC= I · 4θ(1−G(θs/θL))+
R θs+4θ
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ − Cost.
For arbitrarily precise signals, two things occur. First, the IIC never defends a country when
the rate of return is below θs. Second, creditors never withdraw if the return is above θs. This
explains why the lower limit of integration is θs. Again, the first element in the right hand side
of the equality collects the increase in output due to the increase in the average return. The
second accounts for the drop in liquidation cost due to the lower probability of observing a run.
To analyze the moral hazard implications of the introduction of standstills one has to compare
the net benefits under both scenarios. The best way to do so is to compare them element by
element. Define 4W IIC −4WN = A+D. As θ0 > θs, then
A = I · 4θ[G(θ0/θL)−G(θs/θL)] > 0,
and
D =
Z θs+4θ
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ−
Z θ0+4θ
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ < 0
The presence of the IIC increases the range of fundamentals for which the country can enjoy
the increased return, making effort more attractive than in the absence of the Court. This is
the effect displayed in A.In addition, the returns for which the country saves liquidation costs
are lower in the case in which the Court can act. The presence of the IIC protects countries in
such a way that only under relatively low returns a run is observed. Countries tend to worry less
about the liquidation cost occurring on that tail of the distribution, so they have little interest
in applying effort. They are already hedged against runs by the presence of the Court. This is
the element reflecting the moral hazard, its effect being displayed by D. It is not possible to
give an a priori answer of the moral hazard effects from having an IIC.
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Numerical evaluation
Given the difficulties to obtain analytical conclusions, the effect of the IIC on the incentives
to apply effort is numerically analyzed. The focus is on how the results change as the average
return without effort (θL), the return to effort (4θ), and the variance of the public signal ( 1γ )
are allowed to change.14 The values used on the parametrization are summarized in Table 1.
E 0.1 k 0.8
M 0.5 θL (1.25, 1.50)
I 1 4θ (0.1, 0.35)
i 0.1 1γ (0.2, 1.2)
Table 1. Parameter values.
The model was parameterized to obtain situations where the Court could both represent an
incentive to exert effort, and generate moral hazard. To get this result two things had to be
assumed.15 First, the liquidation costs have to be high. It was not possible to find situations in
which, with liquidation costs below 70%, the IIC represented a good incentive. Second, highly
leveraged governments has to be assumed. Given the parametrization above, the value of dI
equals 0.95. This is a situation of extreme leverage, as most of the investment is being financed
exclusively through debt. This should be seen as an indication of the fact that the introduction
of the Court is very likely to generate negative incentives to apply effort. Figures 3a to 3f,
summarize the results.
Figures 3a and 3b show how the moral hazard changes with the initial average return, in
scenarios with low/high variance where return to effort is kept low, and scenarios with low/high
returns to effort while keeping the variance low. Clearly, increases in the initial return increase
the incentives problem generated by the Court. Only when the variance or the return to effort
are low, one observes that for low initial returns the IIC represents an incentive to exert effort.
The reason is that, as the initial average return increases, the saving in liquidation costs faced
when the court is not present grows much faster than in the presence of the Court, which makes
effort relatively more desirable in the absence of the Court.
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Figure 3 : Incentives to apply effort under different parametrizations
As shown in figures 3c and 3d, similar results are obtained when the return to effort is allowed
to change. Again, the only situations in which the Court does not generate moral hazard are
the ones where variance, initial return and return to effort are low. Increases in the return to
effort are much less of an incentive when the Court is present. This is explained by the fact
that without the Court the greater return to effort, the greater the reduction in liquidation
costs if effort is applied. Finally, the effect on the incentives stemming from changes in the
precision of public information is analyzed. When public information is scant, the difference
in incentives vanishes. This is so because, as uncertainty increases any outcome becomes more
feasible, reducing the relative gains in terms of increased returns or reduced liquidation costs.
This can be seen from figures 3e and 3f .
Summary 2 The only situations where the Court represents an incentive to apply costly policies
are those with low initial return and low return to effort. However, this incentive vanishes as
uncertainty increases. The results seem to reflect the general view that policies aimed at helping
20
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countries in financial stress, generate moral hazard problems. However, it is worth noting that
in cases where the situation is relatively bad (low initial return), the IIC can represent a good
incentive to convince these countries to apply costly policies.
If this was all, one should question if such a policy option is a good idea. However, as the next
point makes clear, standstills can become a useful tool also to generate incentives on debtors if
resort to the Court by sovereigns is conditioned on ethe country’s adjustment effort. .
Addressing the incentives problem: Conditionality
What would happen if resort to the IIC by sovereigns was conditioned to the adjustment effort?.
To introduce the effort decision, the timing of the game is slightly modified by introducing
a new period, in which the government has to make a decision on its effort. Now, in period
0, the government has to choose whether to apply a high or low level of effort.16 It will be
assumed that this decision can be perfectly monitored.17 This implies that everybody knows
if the country has applied the commited policies. Therefore, when investors have to play the
roll-over subgame, they know if they can expect the IIC to intervene or not.
With this set-up the game is solved basically as before. The only difference is that, now,
investors take into account the level of effort exerted. Investors know that if the level of effort
is high, the IIC will be there to consider the application of a standstill. In that situation they
will again set their threshold for the private signal at s∗. Conversely, if they observe that the
level of effort is low, they know that the IIC will not grant a standstill whatever happens, and
they will choose to run whenever their private signals fall below the threshold s0. These changes
affect the incentive to exert effort in the presence of the IIC. Now the level of utility of the
government conditional on its effort is 4W IICcond(L) =
R∞
θ0 [θI +M −D] · g(θ/θL) · dθ, if low, and,
4W IICcond(H) =
R∞
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ −Cost, if high.
Therefore, with an IIC, the increase in utility from exerting effort is,
4W IICcond=
Z ∞
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ −
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θL) · dθ −Cost.
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In the absence of the IIC the incentive to exert effort is the same as before,
4WN=
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ −
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θL) · dθ − Cost.
The moral hazard implications of this way of implementing standstills are summarized in
the following two propositions.
Proposition 5 Making the application of standstills conditional on whether effort is exerted
increases the incentives to apply effort with respect to the situation in which standstills are
granted regardless of the level of effort, 4W IICcond > 4W IIC .
Proof. The difference in welfare increase due to increased effort (which is the difference in
incentives to exert effort) between conditional and unconditional standstill policy is
4W IICcond −4W IIC =
Z θ0
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θL) · dθ
which as long as θs < θ0 is strictly positive.
Proposition 6 When compared with the incentive to exert effort in the absence of standstills,
the policy of conditional standstills enhances the incentives of the debtor country to do so,
4W IICcond > 4WN .
Proof. In this case we want to analyze the sign of the following difference
4W IICcond −4WN =
Z ∞
θs
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ −
Z ∞
θ0
[θI +M −D] · g(θ/θH) · dθ
which again as long as θs < θ0 is strictly positive.
Two extreme cases have been analyzed here. One, where help is unconditional, and one
where the help is conditioned in some, perfectly observable actions. As expected, results say
that conditionality and perfect monitoring make an effort-increasing device of standstills. The
main conclusion is that while a policy of unconditional restructuring is likely to have perverse
effects on the incentive to exert effort, the implementation of a conditional standstills policy, in
which restructuring depends on the country’s behavior, represents an incentive to apply effort.
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It would be interesting to adapt the set-up to recognize that monitoring is not perfect. It seems
reasonable that the lower the ability to monitor the country is, the greater the possibility of the
policy generating moral hazard problems.
IV. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the potential for a standstills policy applied by an International Court
to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to sovereign debt contracts in the context of
liquidity problems. It is found that presence of the Court forces investors to focus on its course
of action rather than just second guessing other investors beliefs, thereby reducing the scale of
the coordination problem and creditors’ aggressiveness in situations of stress. This result, which
holds regardless of the precision of the information handled by the Court, runs against the "rush
for the exits" critique (see Gai and Shin, 2004). However, the paper shows that, if the Court
acts cautiously, its potential to mitigate the coordination problem increases the better informed
it is. From this perspective, it is suggested that a standstill policy can be welfare enhancing.
However, the parametrization of the model shows that, under general conditions, such a policy
can introduce distortions on debtors’ incentives. For the case in which policy implementation is
perfectly observable, the use of conditionality has the potential to mitigate such moral hazard.
Some questions remain unanswered. For instance, it is not addressed whether the Court may
affect the returns demanded on sovereign debt by creditors or whether it may reduce the stock of
capital available for the sovereigns (see Martin and Peñalver, 2003). Subsequent research could
address this issue while keeping the focus on the coordination problem, which is at the core of
the model developed here.
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Appendix
I. Benchmark economy. Uniqueness
Here it will be shown that, for the benchmark, uniqueness is guaranteed as long as the relative
precision of the private signal is large enough. The proof follows Bannier (2003).
Equation (2) has a slope ∂s
0
∂θ0 = 1 +
1√
α
∂Φ−1((θ0+kMI −θs)
I
kD )
∂θ0 .
Rewriting equation (3) as s0 = α+γα (θ
0 − γeθα+γ − Φ−1(
r
r+w )
1√
α+γ ) , its slope is
∂s0
∂θ0 =
α+γ
α .
The sufficient condition for uniqueness is satisfied if α+γα < 1+
1√
α min(
∂Φ−1((θ0+kMI −θs)
I
kD )
∂θ0 ),
as in that case, the slope of equation (2) is always bigger than that of equation (3), implying
that at most there is one crossing point. Note that the minimum of ∂Φ
−1(.)
∂θ0 is equal to the
reciprocal of the maximum value of ∂Φ(.)∂θ0 , which is
1√
2π
. Thus, we can rewrite the condition as
α > γ
2
2π . As long as,the condition on the precision of the public and private signals stated above
holds, the derived trigger equilibrium is unique.18
II. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that C < (1− q)R. We define ρIIC = γβ+γbθ + ββ+γS. Recall
A(ρIIC) = R(1 + q)
Z θ∗
θs
π((
p
β + γ(θ − ρIIC ))dθ = qR+ C
Note that lim
ρ→−∞
A(ρIIC) = limρ→∞
A(ρIIC)= 0.
Solving max
ρ
A(ρIIC) = maxρ
(R + qR)[Π(x) − Π(xs)], where x =
√
β + γ(θ∗ − ρIIC) and
xs =
√
β + γ(θs − ρIIC).
The first order condition is, π(x) = π(xs) =⇒ π(
√
β + γ(θ∗−ρIIC)) = π(
√
β + γ(θs−ρIIC))
. There are two possibilities for this equation to hold.
The first one implies θ∗ = θs, and ρIIC not defined, which is obviously not the case because
as long as f > 0 we know that θ∗ > θs. The second one, which makes use of the symmetry of
the normal distribution, implies that ρIIC − θs = θ∗ − ρIIC . It is easy to see that the maximum
of the function above is obtained for ρMIIC =
θ∗+θs
2 .
Finally, using again the first order condition just derived, the behavior of the function opti-
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mized above can be analyzed. ∂A(ρIIC)∂ρIIC =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
> 0 if ρIIC < ρ
M
IIC
< 0 if ρIIC > ρ
M
IIC
. All this can be used to prove
the proposition. Note that A(ρIIC), which is continuous, starts at zero and ends up also at zero.
Note also that it continuously increases until ρIIC = ρ
M
IIC , and decreases afterwards.
Then as long as R(1 + q)
R θ∗
θs
π((
√
β + γ(θ − ρMIIC ))dθ − qR > C, the function A(ρIIC)
intersects twice with the line C + qR.
Call those values ρsupIIC and ρ
inf
IIC . Use ρIIC =
γ
β+γ
bθ + ββ+γS to recover SsupIIC and SinfIIC .
Moreover, for all values of the signal between those two the equation above holds with strict
inequality, and the Court will declare a standstill for all signals falling in the interval [SinfIIC , S
sup
IIC ]
as stated in the proposition.
III. Existence of a unique equilibrium in trigger strategies with the Court
Here it will be shown that the proposed equilibrium is, if some conditions to be derived below
hold, unique. Recall equations (4), (5), (6).
Applying the following changes of variables λ =
p
α+ γ(θ∗ − γγ+αbθ − αγ+αs∗), and λs =p
α+ γ(θs − γγ+αbθ − αγ+αs∗), equation (6) can be rewritten as,
r
r + w
=
Z w
−∞
φ(w)dw −
Z w
ws
φ(w)(Π(µ)−Π(µs))dw,
where µ and µs are implicit functions of λ, λ, λs and other parameters of the model.
The right hand side of the above expression is increasing in both λ and λs. To see it
decompose further the expression above to get,
r
r + w
=
Z λs
−∞
φ(λ)dλ+
Z λ
λs
φ(λ)dλ−
Z λ
λs
φ(λ)(Π(µ)−Π(µs))dλ
=
Z λs
−∞
φ(λ)dλ+
Z λ
λs
φ(λ)F (µ, µs)dλ.
It is evident that, as long as the function F (µ, µs) ∈ (0, 1), for increases in λ and λs the
value of the right hand side increases. But, as SsupIIC > S
inf
IIC , the function F is always in that
interval, and therefore the expression is always increasing in both arguments.
The next step is proving that the partial derivative of both λ and λs with respect to s∗ is
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negative. This implies that increases in threshold for the signal of the small investors reduced
the value of λ and λs, and therefore reduce the expression on the right hand side. The fact that
the expression is strictly decreasing in s∗ implies that there is a unique point where the equality
holds, and this is the unique solution for the problem.
Rewrite (4) using the definition of λ as,
(8) θ∗ = (θs −
kM
I
)+
kD
I
Φ(−λ− γ√
α+ γ
bθ+(√α+ γ−√α)θ∗+(√α− α√
α+ γ
)s∗).
Now, calculate the derivative of λ with respect to s∗,
(9)
∂λ
∂s∗
=
√
α+ γ
∂θ∗
∂s∗
− α√
α+ γ
.
Plugging ∂θ
∗
∂s∗ =
kD
I φ(.)[−
∂λ
∂s∗+(
√
α− α√
α+γ
)]
(1−kDI φ(.)(
√
α+γ−√α)) back into (8) gives,
∂λ
∂s∗
=
kD
I φ(.)[
(α+γ)
√
α−α√α√
α+γ ]−
α√
α+γ
1 + kDI φ(.)
√
α
.
As stated, a sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique is that the derivative above
is negative. As the denominator is positive, in order to have uniqueness, the following must
hold,
(10)
∂λ
∂s∗
< 0⇔ φ(.)[(α+ γ)
√
α− α√α√
α+ γ
]− α√
α+ γ
< 0,
so that kDI φ(.)γ <
√
α. But φ has its maximum value at the mean, φ(mean) = 1√
2π
. This
leads to α > γ2 k
2D2
2πI2 . For private signals with precision above the one just derived
∂λ
∂s∗ < 0. As
∂λs
∂s∗ = −
α√
γ+α < 0 independently of the precision, for signals with the precision just derived,
both derivatives are negative and therefore there is a unique s∗ solving (6). This unique s∗
determines θ∗, and this last one uniquely determines Ssup and Sinf .
28
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0636 
                                    Figure 2: Range of action of a cautious IIC 
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Notes
1At the end of June 2005, the stock of outstanding EM sovereign bonds including CACs was 53% in value,
with the issuance proportion at 86% of such bonds (by value) between the first quarter fo 2003 and the second
quarter of 2005. See Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2005).
2 It might be worth noting that such provisions were included in recent debt exchanges by Argentina, the
Dominican Republic and Uruguay (IMF, 2005, p. 44).
3Although very important it is out of the scope of the paper to address the political difficulties of making such
an institution operational.
4See Haldane et al. (2004) on the first, and Corsetti et al (2005), Rochet and Vives (2004) or Morris and Shin
(2006) on the second.
5Willingness to repay is another important aspect of the sovereign debt problem. Although is not explicitly in
our model one could argue that moral hazard is directly related to willingness to repay.
6Rate of return and the fundamentals of the economy will be used as synonyms.
7This can be rationalized by assuming that investors have a utility function which is just the sum of consumption
at any date. In this case if waiting gives bigger consumption waiting is the right option.
8Since noise is independent, the probability of a creditor holding beliefs below ρ0 is equal to the proportion of
investors with beliefs below ρ0.
9A sovereign state can only renounce immunity from jurisdiction and execution by contractual means (Horn,
2004).
10The assumption that the IMF seeks to intervene only when the country is fundamentally sound is standard
in the literature (see Morris and Shin, 2006). Here it is assumed that it is also a valid assumption for the
supranational authority. It seeks to intervene and disrupt market functioning as little as possible.
11 In Rochet and Vives (2004) the big player´s payoffs can be understood as monetary payoffs. In this case it
seems more natural to think that the costs reflect, not only the cost of the analysis (which is relatively small),
but also costs associated with the disruption of capital flows which will affect both the economy and international
financial markets in general.
12See Section 7.2 in Vives (JEL, 2005) for a proof that this type of supermodular games has only solutions in
trigger strategies.
13Corsetti et al. (2005) contains a similar analysis.
14The return to effort is modeled as the percentage increase with respect to the initial return.
15 It should be noted that this part of the analysis is not intended as a calibration exercise based on some
underlying empirical observations.
16 It has to decide if it applies some costly adjustment policies or not.
17This assumption is standard in this kind of models. For an example see Morris and Shin (2003).
18This is only a sufficient condition. Additionally, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies can be used
   9
to show that this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium (see Morris and Shin, 2000).
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